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Abstract 
Genomic data are becoming increasingly valuable as we develop methods to utilize the 
information at scale and gain a greater understanding of how genetic information relates to 
biological function.  Advances in synthetic biology and the decreased cost of sequencing are 
increasing the amount of privately held genomic data.  As the quantity and value of private 
genomic data grows, so does the incentive to acquire and protect such data, which creates a need 
to store and process these data securely. We present an algorithm for the Secure Interrogation of 
Genomic DataBases (SIG-DB). The SIG-DB algorithm enables databases of genomic sequences 
to be searched with an encrypted query sequence without revealing the query sequence to the 
Database Owner or any of the database sequences to the Querier. SIG-DB is the first application 
of its kind to take advantage of locality-sensitive hashing and homomorphic encryption to allow 
generalized sequence-to-sequence comparisons of genomic data.  
Introduction 
Genomic information is becoming valuable to a variety of applications, including healthcare and 
industry. Thus, biological data privacy and security is becoming increasingly important, 
especially as our understanding of how genetic information relates to biological function 
continues to grow.  The genomic sequence of an individual not only provides information of 
identity, but can reveal family lineage, physical traits, and disease susceptibility.  However, there 
is inherent tension between the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
requirements for patient data privacy, and scientific and/or public health utility of genomic data.  
For example, researchers who want to study the genetics of disease may wish to compare patient 
genome databases in a way that allows data mining while complying with HIPAA obligations.   
 
Microbial genomic data is also increasing in quantity and value as microbes are being utilized for 
industrial, agricultural, and medical purposes. Advances in synthetic biology are creating 
valuable opportunities in healthcare and industry, where the market in 2016 was $3.9B, and is 
projected to grow to $11.4B by 20211.  In particular, synthetic biology is transforming industrial 
practices, where microorganisms are exploited to produce commercial products, resulting in 
customized microbes and unique genomic data. With that comes fierce corporate competition, 
and the genomic information becomes proprietary.   Increasingly, the impact of the human 
microbiome on health is also an active area of research2,3. As we expand our understanding of 
the microbiome, our personal microbial fingerprint may become part of the data stored in 
electronic health records4. Therefore, we may arrive at a consensus that a person’s microbiome is 
as important to protect as a person’s genome. Additionally, genomic information has become an 
important component of the identification, characterization, and attribution of an unknown 
microbiological sample, such as an outbreak of a novel infectious agent. To execute the 
appropriate bioinformatic analyses, known genomic data is required to compare against the 
sample’s genomic data.   However, the growing amount of privately held and proprietary 
genomic information, and the lack of secure computation techniques for sequence-to-sequence 
comparisons on that data, could hinder the timely genomic analysis of the novel microorganism.  
 
Data in storage can be protected by hardware- or software-based encryption, but sensitive data is 
vulnerable during processing.  Therefore, there is a need for methods, including search and 
comparison methods, that permit the processing of data while preserving security. Several 
approaches have been published that demonstrate software-based, secure, multi-party 
computation for biomedical applications, including Yao’s protocol5, oblivious transfer6, and 
many others7. Because human genomes are highly conserved, however, much of the existing 
work is on methods for assessing genomic variation at the SNP8,9 or causal variant5 level.   
 
Homomorphic Encryption (HE)8–10 is a class of methods with properties11,12 that make sequence-
to-sequence comparisons, such as searching polynucleotide sequence databases, amenable to 
encryption. HE differs from other encryption methods by allowing operations directly on 
encrypted data without access to a private key. The result remains encrypted and can be revealed 
to the owner at a later point with their private key. There are two classes of HE: fully HE and 
partial HE.  Fully HE systems allow an arbitrary set of operations (e.g., addition, subtraction, 
division, and multiplication) to be performed on ciphertext, but currently come at an 
operationally intractable computational expense.  Partial HE systems allow a much smaller 
subset of operations on ciphertext, with each encryption system developed to support a specific 
set of operations.  The Paillier homomorphic encryption system (PHE)12 is an additive (+) HE 
cryptosystem. PHE algorithms can be orders of magnitude faster than fully HE 
cryptosystems11,13, and thus are promising for immediate operational applications. To date, there 
is no published work we are aware of that leverages any version of HE for polynucleotide 
sequence-to-sequence comparisons. 
 
We have developed an algorithm, Secure Interrogation of Genomic DataBases (SIG-DB), which 
is designed to enable a two-party exchange. In this exchange, a Querier encrypts a genetic 
sequence of interest and passes it to a Database Owner. The Database Owner then compares the 
encrypted sequence to each item in the database and calculates an encrypted similarity score. 
After comparisons, the encrypted similarity scores are passed back to the Querier, decrypted with 
the Querier’s private key, and interpreted. In this exchange, the query and each element in the 
database are kept secret while allowing sequence-to-sequence comparisons. We demonstrate the 
SIG-DB algorithm’s performance on microbial genomic data obtained from the National Center 
for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) Assembly database14, but see broader applications across 
any sequence-to-sequence comparison. 
 
Results 
The SIG-DB algorithm is intended for use between two parties: a Querier and a Database Owner 
who is willing-but-unable to share his genomic data without having a way to protect it. For 
example, these parties may be businesses wanting to keep their IP protected while collaborating, 
hospitals collaborating on research while considering HIPAA requirements, or an investigator 
and a genomic data company. This protocol requires both the Querier and the Database Owner to 
be willing participants in the transaction. 
 
There are two major components of the SIG-DB protocol. First, the genomic sequences are 
converted to a storage efficient data structure.  To do so, we chose to use k-mers and locality-
sensitive hashing (LSH).  The use of k-mers is an established method of breaking up genetic 
sequences without appreciative data loss; the size of the k-mer can be optimized for a specific 
application. LSHs are also space efficient data structures that store information as either a 1 or 0 
and, unlike Bloom filters, force the data to a preset vector size that is smaller than the original 
data dimensions. For example, the sequence ‘TATCAGA’ would represent a 1 in a separate 
location within the LSH than ‘ATCAGAT’ (see Figure 1). The size of the LSH is a trade-off 
between computational runtime and the likelihood of a false match (i.e. hash collision) in the 
LSH.  For our application, the LSH length is set to be five times the length of the longest 
sequence of all the sequences being compared. Thus, the probability of a hash collision is 18%. 
This probability can be changed based on user requirements, and specifically, it can be lowered 
by increasing the size of the LSH (with an increase in runtime), or by using multiple hash 
functions in conjunction to build a Bloom filter rather than an LSH15.  
 
 Figure 1. Example of a Locality Sensitive Hash (LSH), derived from a DNA sequence. In SIG-
DB, the k-mers are created using a sliding window of 1 character, as illustrated, with a sequence 
of length n resulting in ‘n-k’ k-mers.  
 
Second, the query LSH data are encrypted, compared to database entries, and resulting scores 
decrypted. SIG-DB compares encrypted queries against unencrypted genomic sequences in a 
database while only revealing minimal information about the database to the Querier, and no 
information about the query to the Database owner. This is achieved by sending the encrypted 
query to the Database Owner where computation can be carried out behind the database firewall. 
For each query-database entry LSH comparison, the magnitude of the database entry LSH and an 
encrypted intersection score are returned to the Querier. From this information, the Querier can 
calculate similarity scores as the intersection over union (IoU), the intersection over magnitude 
of query LSH (IoQ), and the intersection over magnitude of database entry LSH (IoD). The full 
workflow can be seen in Figure 2, outlining the steps in both encrypted and unencrypted space.  
 Figure 2. SIG-DB protocol for (1) hashing sequence into locality sensitive hash (LSH), (2) 
encrypting and passing LSH, (3) hashing database elements into LSHs, (4) comparing encrypted 
query LSH to unencrypted database LSHs, (5) passing scores and decrypting, and (6) calculating 
IoU, IoD, and IoQ scores. Unencrypted space = blue boxes and encrypted space = green boxes.  
 
Proportion of sequence mutation & K-mer size 
We conducted tuning experiments to identify the effect of k-mer size on algorithm performance 
and tested the extent to which SIG-DB is robust to sequence mutations, using a dataset of 50 
Escherichia coli genomes and 50 Staphylococcus aureus genomes (from which the query 
sequences were selected then compared against).  The k-mer length was tested at k={8, 16, and 
32}.  Uniformly distributed, random mutations were introduced to query sequences in silico in 
5% increments, ranging from 0%-100%.  Using a k-mer length of 8, the SIG-DB algorithm 
correctly returned the sequence of interest as the highest IoU score for sequences with mutation 
rates from 0-45% for E. coli and 0-35% for S. aureus (Table 1). The mutation rate tolerance 
decreases as the k-mer size increases (Figure 3).   We found that the method correctly identified 
the presence of similar sequences in the subject database to a greater level of divergence when k 
was set to 8. Therefore, we set k=8 for all subsequent work.  
 
Figure 3. Intersection over Union (IoU) scores for k-mer = {8, 16, 32} with random query 
sequence mutation rates from 0-100%. K-mer = 8 showed best performance, with correct 
identification of sequence of interest up to mutation rates of 45%. The red circles indicate the 
largest mutation rate for each k-mer size that returned the correct result as the highest IoU value. 
The horizontal red line represents IoU = 0.1.  
 
Percent Sequence Mutation 
The similarity scores are drastically reduced with minor point mutations because a single 
mutation affects every k-mer associated with it. For example, the sequence 
TCGATCGATCGATCGA with a point mutation at the highlighted “A” represents a mutation in 
the 8-mers TCGATCGA, CGATCGAT, GATCGATC, ATCGATCG, TCGATCGA, 
CGATCGAT, GATCGATC, ATCGATCG. For this reason, shorter k-mers are more robust to 
data degradation and thus lead to better SIG-DB algorithm performance. However, decreasing k-
mer size comes at a computational cost; therefore, algorithm performance is a trade-off between 
k-mer size and run-time.  
 
Location of sequence mutation 
The previous mutation tests assumed a random distribution of mutations throughout the genomic 
sequence, representing single base pair discrepancies between a query and a database sequence. 
To test the effect of mutations localized to one-half of a sequence with the other half a perfect 
match to an element of the database (i.e. sequences that overlap by 50%), we assessed the 
performance of the algorithm with 0-50% mutation.   
 
Using a data set of 50 E. coli genomes, an E. coli query sequence, and a k-mer length of k=8, the 
SIG-DB algorithm correctly returned the query sequence of interest as the highest IoU score for 
sequences with mutation rates from 0% (IoU = 1.0) to 45% (IoU = 0.41). A 0% mutation 
represents two identical sequences, and a 50% mutation represents two sequences that overlap 
and match by exactly 50% (Table 2). The similarity scores had a less dramatic decline when 
mutations are localized to a section of the sequence, compared to the sharp decline that occurred 
when the mutations are dispersed throughout the entire sequence.  This observation is expected, 
because fewer k-mers are affected by the mutations when they are localized to one half of the 
sequence (Supplemental Figure S1).   
 
Query runtime relative to DB size 
To ensure a secure query does not reveal information about the query through execution time, the 
total run-time must scale linearly with the size of the database being searched. This prevents the 
point at which the algorithm stops from revealing which database entry met the appropriate 
search criteria. To test the linear scalability of the SIG-DB algorithm, queries were executed 
against databases containing an increasing number of sequences for four different query sizes. 
Sequences of length 100, 1000, 10000, and 20000 base pairs were queried against databases with 
7, 70, 700, 7078, and 75958 entries, respectively, and demonstrated a linear relationship between 
query execution time and database size (Table 3).  
 
Length of query relative to DB entries 
Biological sequences inherently are quite variable in size, with genomes ranging from thousands 
(viruses) to billions (plants and mammals) of base pairs, depending on the species. Therefore, it 
is likely the query sequence will not be the same size as the database entries, and that the 
database entries will vary in length.  We included 3 similarity metrics (IoU, IoQ, and IoD) in the 
output to account for sequence size variation. To test the robustness of SIG-DB and the similarity 
metrics for queries and database entries of varying relative lengths, using a data set of 50 E. coli 
genomes and an E. coli query sequence, we compared performance on sequences that ranged in 
relative length from 1:1 to 4:1/1:4 (Q:DB, respectively).  The sequence lengths tested varied 
from 5,000bp to 20,000bp, which represent the typical size ranges for viral genomes and 
bacterial genes. The k-mer size was held constant at k=8, and no mutations were introduced. For 
all ratios tested, SIG-DB returned the correct sequence as the highest IoU (Table 4).  When the 
database sequences were held constant at 20,000bp and the query sequence reduced to smaller 
sizes, the IoQ=1.0 for every test.  When flipped, the IoD=1.0 for every test.  This performed as 
expected, because for IoQ (or IoD), only the length of the query (or database entry, respectively) 
is factored into the similarity score calculation. Therefore, the scoring would be a perfect match 
for all ratios tested (Supplemental Figure S2).    
 
Correctness 
To test the robustness of the algorithm to return the correct results, we conceptualized the 
algorithm as a classifier and tested the classification accuracy by setting a similarity score 
threshold, above which the algorithm can be thought of as reporting that a particular database 
entry was similar to the query. We used Average Nucleotide Identity (ANI), a measure of 
pairwise bidirectional nucleotide similarity, as the ground truth similarity measurement for each 
query-database entry comparison, with ANI thresholds of 95% and 99%16,17.   
 
The algorithm performed well across all database entry length sets and under both ANI 
thresholds (AUC values range from 0.97 to 1.00). In fact, with an ANI threshold of 0.95 (a 
slightly more ‘permissive’ gold standard), the algorithm was essentially a perfect classifier 
(AUC=1.00 for all length sets) - assigning similarity scores to database entry-query pairs in 
exactly the same order as their ANI score rankings (Supplemental Figures S3, S4). 
 
Practicality 
One major concern for using homomorphic encryption techniques for operational purposes is the 
computational expense.  Total execution time for SIG-DB ranges from a few seconds to 
approximately 1300 seconds when using a single CPU core to process a single query against a 
database of 100 entries with sequence lengths of 100 and 20,000 bases, respectively 
(Supplemental Figure S5). Parallelization helps performance but has diminishing returns for 
more than 16 CPU cores. For example, with a 20,000 bp query sequence length and a database of 
82,992 sequences, the execution time goes from 51 minutes with one core to 21 minutes with 16 
cores - a reduction of more than 50%.  However, when looking only at scoring time, 
performance is worse when the algorithm is parallelized.  This observation is likely related to the 
size of the query being scored and how efficient it is, or is not, to divide the work over several 
CPUs at the same time, versus running the calculation on a single CPU without that overhead.  
Additionally, query comparison time and similarity scoring time are the most time intensive 
steps, and they appear to be equal even as parameters change (Supplemental Figure S6).   
 
The linear scalability of execution time is an important requirement of HE algorithms. If this 
does not occur, then one or more parties may infer information about the encrypted data from the 
point in which computation ends. For example, if searching for an exact match in a database, if 
the algorithm terminates before searching all elements of the database, then the database holder 
can infer that the last element searched was an exact match for the query.  Our algorithm 
searches every element of a database and was shown to scale linearly as a function of database 
size (factor of 8 difference between total execution time of tests ran with 100 and 1000 database 
entries; Supplemental S7).  
 
Discussion 
We developed the secure interrogation of genomic databases (SIG-DB) algorithm as a proof-of-
concept for a suitable, technologically feasible approach to compare a genomic sequence of 
interest to a privately-held database and produce an indication of similarity between the sequence 
of interest and each database entry. This approach could enable bioinformatics practitioners or 
investigators to leverage privately held information in a secure way – a capability that is non-
existent today for genomic sequence comparisons.  This tool could expedite the timeliness of 
queries and gain meaningful results in critical timeframes for infectious disease event response 
decisions. This is important, as many bioinformatics practitioners are not security experts, and 
thus are less likely to develop applications in this space.  
 
The overall security of an encrypted data manipulation algorithm is fundamental to its success. 
The SIG-DB algorithm leverages established homomorphic encryption schemes to ensure that no 
outside (non-participating) party can learn the details of specific queries; only information about 
the query request patterns can be learned. It also ensures that no outside party can view the 
database records directly. Only metadata is exchanged in the form of encrypted LSH magnitudes, 
and thus individual data entries are never exposed outside the owners’ own security systems.   
 From the metadata returned, the Querier will learn the number of entries in the database. When 
combined with the DB LSH magnitudes and the similarity scores returned, the Querier could 
extrapolate the diversity within the database. Additionally, if the Querier repeated SIG-DB 
multiple times against the same database using the same query sequence, the Querier could learn 
about any database modifications that may have occurred.  This risk is limited, however, since 
the execution is controlled by the Database Owner, who retains the right to refuse repeat 
executions. 
 
A fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) approach, such as Microsoft SEAL, reduces the amount 
of information leaked by not needing to reveal the magnitudes of Database LSHs (unlike PHE), 
and therefore does not reveal the length of the database entries.  This is because FHE allows for 
division and multiplication, allowing the algorithm to calculate the full similarity score (while 
keeping it encrypted) before passing the information out of the database. However, FHE comes 
with an increased computational cost (an FHE implementation of SIG-DB required 2.25 times as 
long to execute as the PHE implementation; unpublished results), which currently limits its 
operational utility.   
 
We developed this tool with the initial intention of it being used for microbial genomic sequence 
comparisons, especially when a user needs to quickly identify a source of information relevant to 
the query sequence, such as an infectious disease outbreak or intentional release of a bioweapons 
agent. However, there are a number of applications that it could be used for including human 
genomics, healthcare, organizational collaborations, and more.  SIG-DB can be optimized for a 
particular application by modifying the parameters (k-mer size, LSH size, hash collision rate) 
based on the user’s tolerance for mutations, size of database, and computational resources. First, 
the size of the k-mer should be chosen to account for the degree of variability that is captured.  
Our results indicate that a smaller k-mer is robust to mutations and that tolerance is reduced by 
increasing the size of the k-mer.  The operator will need to decide how much variation should be 
tolerated and establish their k-mer size accordingly. Second, the current implementation reports 
three scoring metrics: IoU, IoD, and IoQ.  These were included to account for potential 
variations in sequence size and locations of mutations. Lastly, computational resources should be 
considered and optimized for the given situation.  The process of sequence comparisons and 
decryption will be the most computationally burdensome given the operations over every 
database entry. This should be considered by the query holder when establishing computational 
infrastructure.  Of note, the SIG-DB prototype was developed in Python, and thus runs with the 
efficiency of a Python program. Extensions of this work should include implementing the SIG-
DB algorithm in C++ to allow for faster runtime. 
 
Overall, the SIG-DB algorithm provides a method for a secure multi-party exchange of 
information. The outcome of this protocol is a similarity score, which provides an indication of 
the relative similarity between a query and the interrogated database.  Should the user determine 
there is adequate similarity, the next steps would be based on his needs and processes. We see 
use cases within organizations where parties are willing and open to participate in the exchange, 
but where security of information even within the organization is paramount, such as in the case 
of HIPAA data in healthcare. The potential versatility of this protocol creates an even greater 
opportunity for impact within the broader scientific community. 
 
Methods  
Data 
We accessed and downloaded available bacterial genome data in FASTA format from the 
National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) Assembly RefSeq14 database (DB), 
resulting in a total dataset of 75,958 samples.  The dataset contained 244 gigabytes of complete 
genome, chromosome, scaffold, and contig sequences for all available bacterial species. For 
algorithm testing, we used E. coli (n = 7,078 genomes) and S. aureus genomes (n = 50 genomes) 
as well as the full dataset of all available species genomes (n = 75,958).  
 
Query preparation 
To build the LSH with the appropriate false positive rate, the maximum length of a sequence in 
the database must be obtained from the Database Owner. From this implementation, the LSH is 
constructed to have a 5:1 ratio of available space to filled locations. For testing purposes, 
sequences with maximum length of 20,000 base pairs were used, thus LSHs were initialized to 
have 100,000 available hash locations. For sequences longer than 20,000 base pairs, the first 
20,000 bases were used, and sequences shorter than 20,000 base pairs were used in their entirety. 
Sequence k-mers were hashed into the LSH using the Python hash function.  
 
Homomorphic encryption was implemented with the Python package phe18, implementing the 
Paillier additive homomorphic encryption system (PHE)12.  Under this system, a public 
key/private key pair is generated and each element of an LSH is encrypted using the public key.  
 
Database searching 
An LSH is created for each database entry using the LSH Constructor, provided by the Querier.  
The Database Owner executes the comparison between each DB entry LSH and the encrypted 
Query LSH using the comparison executable provided by the Querier. For each comparison, an 
encrypted intersection score is calculated by the sum of all the encrypted Query LSH hash 
locations corresponding to a filled hash entry in the DB entry’s LSH. The magnitude of the DB 
entry LSH is calculated as the sum of hashes in the LSH. The pair {encrypted intersection score, 
DB entry LSH magnitude} are then returned to the Querier for evaluation.  
 
Similarity metric calculations 
To assess the similarity between the query and the entries in the database, the returned encrypted 
intersection scores are decrypted using the private key. The intersection over union (IoU) score is 
calculated using the unencrypted intersection score, the query LSH magnitude, and the DB entry 
LSH magnitude: 
𝐼𝑜𝑈 =  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
|𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑆𝐻| +  |𝐷𝐵 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑆𝐻| − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Additionally, to account for scenarios with a query sequence shorter than the database sequences, 
the intersection over length of query (IoQ) is calculated using the unencrypted intersection score 
and the query LSH magnitude: 
𝐼𝑜𝑄 =  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
|𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑆𝐻|
 
Finally, to account for scenarios with a query sequence longer than the database sequences, the 
intersection over DB entry LSH magnitude (IoD) is calculated using the unencrypted intersection 
score and the DB entry LSH magnitude: 
𝐼𝑜𝐷 =  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
|𝐷𝐵 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑆𝐻|
 
From the IoU, IoQ, and IoD, the Querier can evaluate the highest similarity and the overall 
similarity of database entries to the query sequence. 
 
SIG-DB Algorithm 
The SIG-DB algorithm is a two-party exchange for sequence-to-sequence comparisons between 
an encrypted query and elements of a database. The steps of the algorithm are as follows: 
1. Querier: From Database Owner, determine largest sequence length in database 
2. Querier: Hash query sequence k-mers into a locality-sensitive hash (LSH) with a 
specified acceptable false positive rate based on largest entry sequence length 
3. Querier: Generate a public/private key pair using the Paillier cryptosystem 
4. Querier: Encrypt each element in the query LSH using the Paillier public key  
5. Querier: Pass the encrypted query LSH, the LSH constructor with hash function, and a 
processing script to the Database Owner 
6. Database Owner: Hash each database sequence entry into an LSH of matching dimension 
to the query LSH using the original hash function, provided by the Querier. 
7. Database Owner: For every database entry LSH : 
1. Calculate encrypted intersection score by the sum of all elements in the encrypted 
query LSH that correspond to a filled entry in the DB LSH 
2. Calculate the magnitude of the DB LSH 
8. Database Owner: return all pairs (DB LSH magnitude and encrypted intersection score) 
to the Querier 
9. Querier: decrypt the encrypted intersection scores using the Paillier private key 
10. Querier: For each query-database entry pair, calculate the intersection over union (IoU), 
intersection over query magnitude (IoQ), and intersection over DB LSH magnitude 
(IoD).   
 
SIG-DB Algorithm testing 
Our algorithm testing was conducted on an NVIDIA Titan X GPU with 64 GB of memory. The 
initial implementation of SIG-DB uses 48 parallel processes to encrypt the LSH and generate the 
reported similarity metrics.  
 
We tested the algorithm using the data downloaded from the NCBI Assembly database. We used 
an LSH with 500-100,000 available locations for hashing relative to standardized sequence 
lengths of 100-20,000 base pairs (always in 5:1 ratio, respectively). These lengths were chosen to 
represent a range of sequences from raw sequence read to small genome sizes. E. coli genomes 
range from between 4,500,000-6,000,000 bases, but for efficiency, we used a reduced fraction of 
the full genome as the first n base pairs of the sequence (seq[1:n]). The algorithm scales to 
encompass full genome size sequences, but appropriate adjustments to LSH size must be made.  
 
In silico sequence mutations 
We introduced mutations into wild-type query sequences randomly across queries of various 
lengths. These mutations were intended to represent point mutations in the sequence as well as 
loss of data quality due to sequencing errors. The point mutations were conducted by changing 
the selected base pair to either one of the remaining three base pairs, or to an ‘X’ representing a 
data error. These mutations were introduced at random distributions across the sequence, ranging 
from no mutations (0%) to full sequence mutations (100%). 
 
Correctness 
A dataset was created from two E. coli genomes (K-12 MG1655 and O157:H7, taken from the 
RefSeq database). 500 non-overlapping database entries were created by sampling at random 
from the full genomes for each of three lengths: 1000, 2000, and 3000 bp. From each database 
entry, a 1000 bp query sequence was selected at random. (Queries taken from a database entry of 
a given length were used only in searches against the database set from which they were 
generated.) In order to have sufficient coverage of the desired genetic diversity, the selected 
query sequences were duplicated twice and the duplicates randomly mutated, where each base 
pair in the two duplicates had a 5% or 10% chance (respectively) of being switched to an 
alternate base. In total, this produced 1,500 queries for each length-set of database entries: 500 
wild-type, 500 samples with 5% mutation, and 500 samples with 10% mutation. 
 
ANI and SIG-DB similarity scores were computed for each database entry-query pair within a 
given length-set. For the SIG-DB score, the maximum of the IoU, IoQ, or IoD was taken to 
account for sequence:query length differences. A Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve 
was generated to determine the tradeoff between true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate 
(FPR). Multiple classification thresholds were defined for the SIG-DB similarity scores such that 
all sequences with similarity ≥ threshold were considered “relevant”. The thresholds were set in 
an increasing manner, starting with Similarity = 0 representing a threshold that counted all 
sequences as “relevant”. Each subsequence threshold was then set as the next highest similarity 
score in the result set. For example, if five sequences had similarity scores of [0.2, 0.33, 0.33, 
0.75, 0.87] then each of the unique scores would be set as a classification threshold, resulting in 
the following counts of the number of “relevant” sequences at each threshold: [5, 4, 2, 1]. For 
each new threshold, the TPR and FPR were calculated, then plotted as a ROC curve.   
 
Practicality 
To assess the practicality of using SIG-DB in operational applications, we performed a series of 
tests to understand the amount of time required to run the full operation on a single CPU core, 
the time savings that could be achieved using a parallelized approach, and the breakout of time 
requirements by step in the protocol (encryption time, query time, and scoring time). All 
bacterial sequences in the RefSeq database were used to perform these tests.  The database 
records have a minimum length of 337 bases, a maximum length of 12,106,419 bases, and an 
average length of 2,756 bases.  Heat maps were generated from test runs that evaluate 3 different 
variables: (1) number of cores used for computation (1 - 48 cores), (2) query length (100 – 
20,000 bases), and (3) number of entries in the database (100, 1000, 5000, and 10000 FASTA 
files; or 10,145 sequences, 89,992 sequences, 425,772 sequences, and 860,984 sequences, 
respectively).   
 
Code/Data availability: 
All code and documentation is available on the B.Next GitHub page, located at 
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this study on October 1st, 2017.  
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Tables 
Table 1. SIG-DB algorithm performance based on 
proportion of sequence randomly mutated in E. coli and S. 
aureus (DB = 50 seqs, LSH = 100k bases, Q = 20K bases, 
E = 20K bases) 
Species 
K-mer 
size 
Percent 
mutation** 
 Best  
IoU IoQ IoR 
E. coli 8 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 
E. coli 8 10 0.35 0.49 0.56 
E. coli 8 20 0.18 0.28 0.33 
E. coli 8 30 0.11 0.19 0.22 
E. coli 8 40 0.09 0.16 0.18 
E. coli 8 50 0.08 0.15 0.14 
E. coli 16 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 
E. coli 16 10 0.19 0.32 0.32 
E. coli 16 20 0.11 0.20 0.20 
E. coli 16 30 0.10 0.19 0.19 
E. coli 32 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 
E. coli 32 10 0.11 0.20 0.20 
E. coli 32 20 0.10 0.19 0.19 
S. aureus 8 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 
S. aureus 8 10 0.35 0.46 0.58 
S. aureus 8 20 0.18 0.26 0.35 
S. aureus 8 30 0.11 0.17 0.23 
S. aureus 8 40 0.08 0.15 0.16 
S. aureus 16 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 
S. aureus 16 10 0.18 0.31 0.31 
S. aureus 16 20 0.11 0.21 0.21 
S. aureus 16 30 0.10 0.19 0.19 
S. aureus 50 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 
S. aureus 50 10 0.10 0.19 0.19 
 Table 2. SIG-DB algorithm performance based on 
mutations localized to one half of total sequence (DB = 50 
seqs, LSH = 100k bases, Q = 20K bases, E = 20K bases) 
Species 
K-mer 
size 
Percent 
mutation** 
 Best  
IoU IoQ IoR 
E. coli 8 5 0.73 0.82 0.87 
E. coli 8 10 0.60 0.71 0.78 
E. coli 8 15 0.52 0.64 0.72 
E. coli 8 20 0.46 0.59 0.67 
E. coli 8 25 0.44 0.57 0.65 
E. coli 8 30 0.42 0.56 0.64 
E. coli 8 35 0.41 0.55 0.62 
E. coli 8 40 0.41 0.55 0.61 
E. coli 8 45 0.41 0.56 0.61 
E. coli 8 50 0.42 0.57 0.61 
 
  
 Table 3. SIG-DB runtime for increasing database sizes (Mut = 0, IoU = 1.0, 
K = 8) 
Species Database size LSH Size 
Query size & DB 
element size 
Run time 
(min) 
E. coli 7 500 100 100 0.03 
E. coli 70 500 100 100 0.03 
E. coli 700 500 100 100 0.07 
E. coli 7,078 500 100 100 0.45 
E. coli 75,958 500 100 100 4.58 
E. coli 7 5,000 1,000 1,000 0.09 
E. coli 70 5,000 1,000 1,000 0.10 
E. coli 700 5,000 1,000 1,000 0.65 
E. coli 7,078 5,000 1,000 1,000 5.44 
E. coli 75,958 5,000 1,000 1,000 101.64 
E. coli 7 50,000 10,000 10,000 0.43 
E. coli 70 50,000 10,000 10,000 1.25 
E. coli 700 50,000 10,000 10,000 8.35 
E. coli 7,078 50,000 10,000 10,000 86.85 
E. coli 75,958 50,000 10,000 10,000 993.82 
E. coli 7 100,000 20,000 20,000 0.85 
E. coli 70 100,000 20,000 20,000 2.69 
E. coli 700 100,000 20,000 20,000 18.22 
E. coli 7,078 100,000 20,000 20,000 185.1 
E. coli 75,958 100,000 20,000 20,000 2215.25 
*7,078 = Total number of E. coli genomic samples 
**75,958 = Total number of all available genomic samples 
  
 Table 4. SIG-DB algorithm performance based on 
relative sizes of query and database elements (K = 8, 
DB = 50 seqs, LSH = 100k bases, Mut = 0) 
Species 
Query size & DB 
element size 
 Best  
IoU IoQ IoR 
E. coli 20,000 20,000 1.0 1.0 1.0 
E. coli 15,000 20,000 0.80 1.0 0.80 
E. coli 10,000 20,000 0.58 1.0 0.58 
E. coli 5,000 20,000 0.31 1.0 0.31 
E. coli 20,000 15,000 0.80 0.80 1.0 
E. coli 20,000 10,000 0.58 0.58 1.0 
E. coli 20,000 5,000 0.31 0.31 1.0 
 
  
Supplemental Tables: 
  
Table S1. ANI Data statistics describing the distribution of the ANI scores for each database element 
length dataset. 
Database element Length Min First 
Quartile 
Mean Third Quartile Max STD 
1000 0.00 0.34 0.41 0.53 1.00 0.09 
2000 0.00 0.36 0.42 0.51 1.00 0.12 
3000 0.00 0.29 0.46 0.59 1.00 0.19 
Supplemental Figures: 
 
 
Figure S1: Similarity scores (IoU, IoQ, and IoD) for k-mer = {8} with random sequence 
mutation localized to one half of the sequence at rates from 0-100%. The red circle represented 
the largest mutation rate that correctly returned the sequence of interest as the highest IoU score. 
  
IoD 
  
Figure S2: Similarity scores for varying sizes of query and DB entries. (A) DB held constant at 
20,000 bases while query varied from 5,000-20,000 bases. (B) Query held constant at 20,000 
bases while DB varied from 5,000-20,000 bases. 
  
(A) (B) 
  
Figure S3: Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curves for Paillier-SIG-DB. Query length 
=1000 bases and ANI threshold of 0.99 for A-C; 0.95 for D. (A) DB entry length=1000 bp with a 
total of 750,000 query to database entry comparisons and 1,515 of those with ANI scores above 
the ANI threshold (true positives) (B) DB entry length=2000 bp with a total of 750,000 query to 
database entry comparisons and 1,549 of those with ANI scores above the ANI threshold (C) DB 
entry length=3000 bp with a total of 750,000 query to database entry comparisons and 1,708 of 
those with ANI scores above the ANI threshold (D) DB entry length=1000bp with a total of 
750,000 query to database entry comparisons and 1,877 of those with ANI scores above the ANI 
threshold (representative of all ROC curves generated using an ANI threshold=0.95). 
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 Figure S4: Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curves for Paillier-SIG-DB based on each 
similarity score – (A) IoD, (B) IoU, and (C) IoQ. Query length =1000 bases and ANI threshold 
of 0.99. The DB entry length was 1000 bp (top row) with a total of 750,000 query to database 
entry comparisons and 1,515 of those with ANI scores above the ANI threshold (true positives) 
and 3000 bp (bottom row) with DB entry length=3000 bp with a total of 750,000 query to 
database entry comparisons and 1,708 of those with ANI scores above the ANI threshold. Using 
IoD as the similarity score when a query is one-third the size of the database entries results in an 
odd ROC curve representing very poor performance, as shown in (A) bottom row.  One possible 
explanation is that the denominator is larger than the possible intersection space, and as such, we 
may be washing out the small differences between the intersections of positive and negative 
examples. In a dataset of only 0.2% positive samples, this leads to broad misclassification.  This 
phenomenon is exactly why we included IoD, IoU, and IoQ as our scoring metrics.    
A B C 
Figure S5. SIG-DB Execution time for a query against a database of 100 entries (10,145 
sequences) using various numbers of cores for computation. 
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 Figure S6: Heat Map showing time of execution for SIG-DB, comparing a single query of 'qlen' 
length to a database containing 1000 entries (82,992 sequences).  The trends in this heat map are 
representative of all scenarios tested. 
  
  
Figure S7: SIG-DB execution time for 100 and 1000 database entries compared to different 
query lengths; both runs performed with 48 cores. Note: y-axis is in log-scale. 
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